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Abstract
This paper deals with two issues concerning the eﬀects of population aging on education
decisions in the presence of a PAYG pension system: We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀects of an aging
population per se on individual skill choices and continuous education and the production
structure. Second, we study the implications of postponed retirement, which is often proposed
as a measure to cope with the economic challenges of increased longevity. Our study uses a
dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping generations and probabilistic aging.
The model allows for capital–skill complementarity in the production of ﬁnal output.
As a response to population aging, in a small open economy with a ﬁxed interest rate, our
ﬁrst simulation shows that GDP is depressed due to an adverse eﬀect on skill choice and labor
supply. We then introduce postponed retirement as a potentially dampening policy measure
due to its encouragement of human capital formation. However, since there is less private
saving in this scenario, the overall eﬀect on GDP is even worse than in the pure aging scenario.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the macroeconomic relevance of education
and human capital formation in an aging society. This topic has received much
attention over recent years, mainly due to the expected sharp increase in the share of
the retired over the working population (cf. Figure 1). Moreover, older workers are
leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages.1 This decline in labor force
participation, which magniﬁes population trends, is due to speciﬁc characteristics
of existing pension systems, which impose considerable negative accrual rates of
pension wealth.
In order to compensate for the adverse eﬀects of the shift in the age structure
on production, labor productivity of the working needs to increase or retirement
must be postponed.2 We analyze the direct eﬀect of a change in the age structure
* I am grateful to Christian Keuschnigg, Mirela Keuschnigg, and Dominik Grafenhofer for our fruitful
collaboration. Valuable comments by Ben Heijdra and two referees greatly improved the paper. All
remaining errors are mine. Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation under project
no. 1214-066928 is gratefully acknowledged.
1 An extensive source on retirement behavior in industrialized countries is Gruber and Wise (1999).
2 Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003) argues that the decrease in the relative size of the economically active population
cannot be balanced by higher capital intensity. Hence, the strengthening of human capital formation
assumes high importance in the face of an aging population.
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due to aging on the individuals’ incentives to invest in education at the extensive
margin. Indeed, aging itself strongly aﬀects the skill structure of the workforce
by changing the distribution of the workers’ seniority. However, additional policy
measures towards increased human capital investment would have to be put in place
in order to maintain total employment and to assure the ﬁnancial viability of existing
pension systems. We show that postponed retirement raises educational attainment
and human capital. However, it induces individuals to save less, which oﬀsets these
beneﬁcial eﬀects.
In this paper, individuals’ intensive and extensive education decisions are studied,
along with their intertemporal consumption choice and labor supply. To be able to
simulate a concrete population and policy scenario, the model realistically reproduces
(1) individual life cycle wage and consumption proﬁles ; (2) the skill composition in
the labor force; (3) skill premia in wages; (4) the change in relative prices and the
production structure due to an aging population and postponed retirement. We use
an overlapping generations (OLG) approach in general equilibrium in order to be
able to analyze intergenerational distribution eﬀects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst give a short overview
of the literature related to our subject. Based on the probabilistic aging approach,
we then motivate our modeling of the production technology allowing for capital–
skill complementarity. Third, we present a stylized model in order to highlight the
important economic eﬀects showing up in our quantitative analysis. We then discuss
the calibration of the model. Finally, we simulate the eﬀects of aging and postponed
retirement on key macro variables in an open economy setting.
2 Related literature
In its complexity, the model relates to four strands of economic literature :
Education and the economy Besides the vast literature on life cycle human capital
investment, which focuses on the intensive margin of education, there is a strand of
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Figure 1. Dependency ratio projections
for Switzerland. The solid line shows
the trend extrapolation, the dashed line
a more pessimistic scenario
Source : BFS (2001).
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literature concentrating on the extensive margin.3 This mostly empirical literature
is concerned with self-selection of students into skill types according to ability types
which aﬀects estimates of occupational choice and the distribution of earnings.
The ﬁrst source is Roy (1951), which has received subsequent elaboration, e.g. by
Heckman and Honore´ (1990). Willis and Rosen (1979) and Heckman et al. (1998)
derive a theoretical model of the demand for college attendance and empirically
show that expected life-time earnings indeed inﬂuence the college attendance
choice decisively. Due to the speciﬁc nature of their sample, there is no ability bias
in the estimation of the enrollment function, a problem which is often encountered
in the empirical assessment of the rate of return to education. Bils and Klenow
(2000) argue that not only schooling leads to higher growth rates, such as in Barro
(1991), but that there is also a reverse channel through which faster growth can
induce more schooling by raising its eﬀective return.
Overlapping generations Economic models with overlapping generations of
households provide a good basis for the analysis of ﬁscal policy and intertemporal
macroeconomics. There are basically two strands of OLG literature : The one with
a large number of generations and detailed life-cycle patterns pioneered by
Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) with reﬁnements by for example, _Imrohorog˘lu et al.
(1999) and Altig et al. (2001). The second strand is based, upon the model by
Ramsey (1928) with inﬁnitely lived consumers. Blanchard (1985) introduces con-
stant mortality hazard, which leads to potentially ﬁnite life times but eternal youth.
The model by Gertler (1999) introduces life-cycle behavior in this framework by
allowing mortality only for the retired. We base our approach on its consequent
enhancement by Grafenhofer et al. (2005), who introduce probabilistic aging,
which allows for mortality among young ages and thereby exhibits a closer ap-
proximation of the demographic structure.
Old-age provision There is a vast literature on the economics of old-age provision,
arguing that its design considerably aﬀects labor market participation and early
retirement.4 Sanchez-Martin (2003) and Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004) use
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to analyze how pension system
reforms may be able to alleviate the expected ﬁnancial diﬃculties of current PAYG
systems. Lau and Poutvaara (2000, 2001) study the impact of social security in-
centives on human capital formation, arguing that actuarial fairness and a tight
contributions–beneﬁt link increase human capital along with an increase in the
retirement age. _Imrohorog˘lu et al. (1995) derive optimal social security replace-
ment rates and associated beneﬁts by means of an applied general equilibrium
model.
Demographic transition The demographic transition in industrialized countries
with lower fertility and higher life expectancy poses challenges to pension systems
and the economy as a whole (cf. e.g. Miles, 1999; Bo¨rsch-Supan and Winter, 2001;
3 Early references in the life-cycle human capital investment literature are Becker (1962) andMincer (1974).
Ben-Porath (1967) formulates a rigorous model which makes the analogy between human capital and
investment in physical capital explicit. Weiss (1986) provides an extensive review of the theoretical
literature, while Mincer (1997) reviews the empirical literature.
4 Recent contributions are Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000), Mitchell and Phillips (2000), Cre´mer and Pestieau (2003),
Bu¨tler et al. (2004), and Gruber and Wise (2005).
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Bovenberg and Knaap, 2005). Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003) argues that in order to ﬁnance
the pension system, contribution and tax rates will have to rise, which reduces
labor force participation of the younger cohorts and destabilizes the pension sys-
tem even more. In a model with imperfect substitutability between less and more
experienced workers, Rojas (2005) shows that the eﬀects of aging are less hazard-
ous than with perfectly substitutable workers. Also, Conesa and Krueger (1999)
consider heterogeneous agents and their impact on the political support for a
funded pension system.
Besides its adverse eﬀects on the pension system, population aging may induce
individuals to invest more in education.5 The contribution of this paper is an analysis
of this eﬀect by means of a model featuring a realistic production structure with
diﬀerentiated labor inputs and coherent education decisions in a general equilibrium
model with overlapping generations based on probabilistic aging, as developed in
Grafenhofer et al. (2005) and Jaag et al. (2005).
3 Capital–skill complementarity
Many life-cycle models with overlapping generations, such as the original Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model, but also, for example, Altig et al. (2001) assume
labor to be homogeneous. Recently, heterogeneous labor has been introduced in
various ways: Heckman et al. (1998) use labor which is diﬀerentiated by skill level,
while Rojas (2005) uses a labor market characterized by imperfect substitutability
between less and more experienced workers, hence introducing a vertical diﬀeren-
tiation of labor. In our model, the individuals’ discrete education choice leads to a
partition of the working population into diﬀerent skill classes, which is mirrored
on the production side, where the ﬁrms’ technology uses as inputs diﬀerentiated
labor and capital, hence giving rise to a horizontal diﬀerentiation of labor. For
simplicity, we assume that the experience of workers does not alter their type of
labor.
The surge in skill-biased information technology during the 1990s, which coincided
with a rise in the wages of skilled workers relative to those of unskilled workers,
suggests that various kinds of labor are of diﬀerent substitutability with capital. The
ﬁrst evidence of this phenomenon is due to Griliches (1969), who refers to his ﬁnding
that capital and skilled labor are more complementary as inputs than are capital and
unskilled labor as the capital–skill complementarity hypothesis. The hypothesis has
received broad attention in the macroeconomic literature, where evidence in its favor
has important implications on how to specify aggregate production in theory, but
also in reassessing the robustness of existing empirical ﬁndings. Quantitative
implications of the hypothesis are studied, for example by Duﬀy et al. (2004) who ﬁnd
only weak evidence in support of it, however. The hypothesis has also been tested
5 Swanson and Kopecky (1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Boucekkine
et al. (2002, 2003), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Huang et al. (2003), Soares (2005), Echevarrı´a (2004), and
Ferreira and Pessoˆa (2005) consistently ﬁnd that human capital accumulation and economic growth are
increased via these channels – possibly even without changes in the social security system.
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in many microeconomic studies with ﬁrm and industry-level data. For a represen-
tative sample of such studies see Hamermesh (1993), who concludes that there is
strong evidence for capital–skill complementarity. However, he cautions that many
of the studies that disaggregate the workforce by demographic group exclude capital
as a productive input due to the lack of a reliable measure of the capital stock. The
assumption of competitive markets allows early studies to proxy variations in the
capital stock by variations in the rates of return. More recent studies refrain from
this assumption and explicitly include the stock of capital in their analysis (cf. Duﬀy
et al., 2004).
Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that physical capital and skills have not always
been viewed as relative complements : In an earlier era, the transformation from
skilled artisan shops to factories involved the substitution of physical capital and
unskilled labor for highly skilled labor – precisely the opposite of what is hypoth-
esized to be happening today. This suggests that capital–skill complementarity may
be a transitory phenomenon: in a country’s development process, skilled labor
may change from being well substitutable with capital and unskilled labor to being
highly complementary to these two inputs. In order to account for this, recent
studies consider panel data over long periods of time (e.g. Duﬀy et al., 2004) or split
the full country sample into subsamples of similar development (e.g. Papageorgiou
and Chmelarova, 2005). A consistent ﬁnding also supported by Galor and Weil
(2000) is that the capital–skill complementarity is especially strong at the beginning
of a development process and may fade out when a technology becomes widely
adopted.
The observed increase in the skill premium during the 1990s in developed countries
may be due to skill-biased technological change, as is brought forward, for example,
by Acemoglu (1998) who argues that an increase in the supply of skills reduces the
skill premium in the short run, but induces biased technological change and hence
increases the skill premium in the long run. Krusell et al. (2000) challenge this view in
an empirical study, where they ﬁnd that with capital–skill complementarity, changes
in observed inputs in the aggregate production function alone account for most of
the variations in the skill premium.
To our knowledge, the approach in this paper is the ﬁrst to employ a production
technology with potentially many types of labor and capital–skill complementarity
in a general equilibrium OLG framework. We start by describing a stylized model
exemplifying the main channels, through which the shocks in the scenarios aﬀect
economic outcomes in our model. The building blocks of the actual CGE model
are described in the appendix.
4 Illustrative simple model
As discussed in Jaag et al. (2005), the human capital accumulation process over
the life cycle can be analyzed independently of other life cycle choices, such as
optimum consumption and leisure. Therefore, in this section, we concentrate on
extensive and intensive education decisions and on the speciﬁcs of the production
technology.
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4.1 Production technology
For an illustration of capital–skill complementarity in production, consider the
simple production function
Y=f(K,L1,L2)=(K+L1)#(L2)1x#
where capital K and unskilled labor L1 are perfect substitutes and have unit elasticity
of substitution with skilled labor L2.6 The ratio of the marginal products of skilled
to unskilled labor, and accordingly the relative wage of high-skilled labor, is
w2
w1
=
fL2
fL1
=
1x#
#
K+L1
L2
: (1)
This will determine human wealth in the respective skill classes and govern the
extensive education decision at the beginning of the life cycle. It also constitutes
the relative labor demand in Figure 4.
4.2 Human capital production
For the illustrative purpose of this section, we consider two diﬀerent types of
human capital ss{1, 2}, which constitute skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
Low-skilled productivity is denoted by h1, while high-skilled productivity is h2. Time
and individual ability are the only inputs of human capital production (cf. Figure 2):
Over her life cycle, an individual spends her time on education up to date e. Then,
she works with exogenously given intensity until retirement at date R.
We assume that individual ability i is relatively more important in acquiring
high-skilled human capital. These characteristics of human capital accumulation
are formalized as
h1=$e
1
 , (2)
h2=e
2
  2 [0, 1]: (3)
Note that for simplicity, h1 is independent of i.7 Individuals maximize their human
capital, i.e. their life-time earnings. The problem of an individual with ability i is
therefore to choose the type of human capital si and the optimal education time spent
0 e
Education Work Retirement
R
Figure 2. An individual’s activity
over the life cycle
6 Note that in order to have capital–skill complementarity with this speciﬁc functional form, deviating
from the functional form in (27), capital has to be nested together with unskilled labor.
7 In the simulated model, ability does not enter the human capital production function, but is a determi-
nant of the cost of acquiring a certain skill level. This leads to a clear stratiﬁcation of ability types in both
formulations. In order to keep this illustrative example simple, we abstain from introducing type-
dependent costs of education – apart from the opportunity costs of time. This is similarly done, e.g. in
Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and Razin and Sadka (2001).
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on its accumulation esi given the retirement date Ri and the wage rate w
s per unit of
human wealth, such that
{s, e
s
}= arg max
{~s, ~e
s
}2{1, 2}r[0,R]
Hs=
Z R
e~s
h~sw
~sdt:
The beneﬁt of a longer education period is an increase in productivity during
the working period. The cost consists of a shorter work life. For any individual of
ability i there is a unique time investment, which maximizes life-time earnings from
any type of human capital
e1= argmax
~e1
(Rx~e1 )$~e
1
w
1=e1=
R
2
, (4)
e2= argmax
~e2
(Rx~e2 )~e
2
w
2=e2=
R
2
: (5)
Since ability enters both beneﬁt and cost symmetrically, there are no diﬀerences
in education among individuals of diﬀerent ability. The resulting skill levels are
therefore, by (2) and (3)
h1=h
1=$
R
2
,
h2=
R
2
:
Hence, optimum skill acquisition is proportional to the expected length of the work-
ing period, and only hi
2 depends on the ability of the individuals in that skill group.
4.3 Extensive education decision
The type of human capital an individual chooses to acquire – measured as the sum
over all life-time earnings – results from a comparison of the respective levels of
human wealth
H1=
Z R
e1
h1w1dt=
R
2
 2
$w1, (6)
H2=
Z R
e2
h2w
2dt=
R
2
 2
w2: (7)
Individuals with higher ability have a comparative advantage in the acquiring of
skills, and the human capital of those investing in skills increases monotonically in
the ability parameter, cf. Figure 3.
An individual is indiﬀerent between acquiring low-skilled and high-skilled human
capital iﬀ
H1=H2~ :
Hence, using (6) and (7), the pivotal (indiﬀerent) worker type ~ is determined by
~=$
w1
w2
: (8)
Education, demographics, and the economy 195
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474747207002983
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:45:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
The relative size of the two skill classes is determined by the relative wage, which
itself by (1) depends on the skill structure in the economy. The total number of
eﬃciency units in each skill class is given by the employment duration, Rxes, times
the number of workers times their human capital. Assuming skills to be distributed
uniformly over the unit interval, iyU (0, 1), and normalizing the total number of
workers to unity, the number of low-skilled workers is equal to N1=~. The number
of high-skilled workers is accordingly N2=1x~. The size of the two labor forces in
eﬃciency units is then given by
L1=(Rxe1)N1h1=
R
2
 2
~$, (9)
L2=(Rxe2)
Z 1
~
h2d=
R
2
 2
1
2
x
1
2
~2
 
: (10)
Relating (9) to (6), we see that the total wage bill for unskilled labor, w1L1 just equals
total human capital H1N1. Substituting (8) for ~, we get
L2
L1
=
1
2$
1
~
x~
 
=
1
2
1
$2
w2
w1
x
w1
w2
 
:
This yields the increasing relative labor supply curve in Figure 4 below.
4.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by a stratiﬁcation of individuals according to (11),
which determines the relative size of the two skill classes, wages and intensive edu-
cation levels. Inserting (1) and (9)/(10) into (8), we implicitly get the equilibrium
pivotal worker type
~=$
#
1x#
R
2
 2 1
2x
1
2
~2
 
K+ R2
 2
~$
(11)
0
H2
H1
1unskilled skilledτ
Figure 3. Discrete choice between
two skill groups
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as a function of the relative importance of the two labor types in production #, the
level of the capital stock K, the retirement date R, and the relative productivity of
time in educational production $.
Since the demand for labor is – by the capital–skill complementarity – tightly
linked to the capital stock, we ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium reaction of education to
changes in capital. The responses of intensive and extensive education to an increase
in the capital stock are
de1
dK
=
de2
dK
=0,
d~
dK
=x
1
K
~+$
R
2
 22x#
1x#
<0:
Educational eﬀort at the intensive margin is not inﬂuenced by a change in the capital
stock since the costs of education consist only of foregone earnings, and a change in
marginal productivity aﬀects both costs and beneﬁts equally. Figure 4 displays the
eﬀect of a decrease in the capital stock at the extensive margin. As long as the relative
supply of low- and high-skilled labor is unchanged, by the complementarity of capital
and skilled labor, the relative demand for skilled labor shifts to the left, moving the
equilibrium from point (a) to (b). The resulting decrease in the skill premium induces
less workers to acquire skills, which shifts the relative supply for skilled labor to the
left, leading to the ﬁnal equilibrium at point (c).
An increase in the retirement age aﬀects education both at the intensive and the
extensive margins. We ﬁnd that in equilibrium the comparative static eﬀects of
postponed retirement on extensive and intensive education are
de1
dR
=
de2
dR
=
1
2
>0,
d~
dR
=
#
1x#
R
2x~
22x#
1x#
R
2
2K
$+2
2x#
1x#
R
2
 2 fo0,
,~of
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
#
2x#
r
:
relative supply
relative demand
c
b
a
w2
w1
L2
L1
Figure 4. Dynamic eﬀects of capital–
skill complementarity
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Educational eﬀort is increased by a prolongation of the redemption period. At the
extensive margin, education increases as long as the relative size of the high-skilled
workforce is below a certain threshold, which is determined by the relative import-
ance of capital and low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor in the production process :
with a high importance of skilled labor, postponed retirement will likely increase
its share.
Relative supply remains unchanged initially, as both labor forces grow in parallel.
According to (1), relative demand shifts to the left, moving the equilibrium from (a)
to (b) in Figure 5. Again, the resulting decrease in the skill premium induces less
workers to acquire skills, which shifts the relative supply for skilled labor to the left.
Considering (9) and (10), the size of this shift depends on the initial relative sizes
of the two workforces. The shift in relative supply leads to the ﬁnal equilibrium at
point (c). Depending on the parameter constellation, the relative wage has risen or
fallen in the new stationary equilibrium.
5 Calibration
Our simulations are based on the discrete-time model developed by Jaag et al. (2005),
incorporating probabilistic aging and frictional labor markets.8 Important features
of this model are detailed in the appendix. We calibrate the model to stylized data of
Switzerland in 2000. Table 1 states key parameters characterizing preferences and
technology. The choice of the most important parameters is detailed in the following
sections by referring to the relevant literature.
Studies on the depreciation rate of human capital range between 1% and 12%
(cf. Heckman, 1976; Haley, 1976; Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2005; and the re-
view by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999). In the applied literature, very low
values are used: zero by Heckman et al. (1998) and 0.025 by Perroni (1995). We
employ a value of 0.05. Following the literature, we calibrate the depreciation rate
of physical capital to 0.1.
relative supply
relative demand
c
b
a
w2
w1
L2
L1
Figure 5. Dynamic eﬀects of post-
poned retirement
8 The feature of frictional labor markets is not explicitly exploited in our simulations, however.
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5.1 Mortality and transition probabilities
Individual aging occurs not deterministically (cf. Section 8.1 in the appendix) : In
every period, there is a probability of aging wa. There is also an age-group speciﬁc
mortality probability 1xca. Let Na denote the number of individuals in age group a.
A tilde indicates the decomposition in annual cohorts, such that NawN˜t. For sim-
plicity, we consider a demographic stationary state and ignore time indices in this
section. We further assume that aging parameters are equal across skill groups.
Setting wa=0 implies that an aging event occurs with probability one in each period,
leading to ~N
t
=~ctx1 ~N
tx1
. The concept of an age group thus becomes identical with
a cohort, where age t is measured by time since birth. Taking age-dependent survival
rates ~ct from oﬃcial mortality tables, the cohort composition of the population in a
demographic steady state can be constructed. Recursively applying ~N
t
=~ctx1 ~N
tx1
yields the size of cohort t relative to the size of a new cohort. Summing up over all
cohorts ﬁxes the size of the new cohort compared to total population size N
~N
t
= ~N
1Ytx1
s=1
~cs, ~N
1
=N
,
;
T
t=1
Ytx1
s=1
~cs:
Taking a total length of life of T years, and based on actual survival rates, we have
thus found the stationary decomposition of the population into a total of T cohorts.
Using the population decomposition indicated in Table 2, each age group contains
several cohorts
Na= ;
aa+1
t=aa
~N
t
:
Given that the instantaneous probability of staying in the current age group is vaca,
the expected duration in group a is
aa+1xaa=1=(1xvaca),
Table 1. Taste and technology parameter calibration
Real interest rate R 1.050
Capital depreciation rate dK 0.100
Skill depreciation rate dS 0.050
Subjective discount factor b 0.997
Cost share of goods invested in education & 0.250
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution s 0.500
Semi-elasticity of discrete skill choice ed 0.100
Training elasticity with respect to training returns ee 0.300
Labor supply elasticity el 0.400
Capital-low-skill elasticity of substitution sK,L
1
1.600
Capital-medium-skill elasticity of substitution sK,L
2
1.000
Capital-high-skill elasticity of substitution sK,L
3
0.600
Social security contribution tW 0.080
Notes : The training and labor supply elasticities are eiwQik/(iQia) for is{e, l}, where Q is a cost
function, cf. (19). Technology as in (27), social security contributions are relative to gross wage
income, such that tWwat l
a
t
~h
a
t=xz
aW
t , where w
a
t l
a
t
~h
a
t is average gross wage income.
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where aa denotes the time when age group a is entered. The chosen age group de-
composition of the actual population corresponds to a life cycle history where an
agent spends exactly the average duration in each age period. One can thus recover
the demographic parameters of the model from our knowledge of aggregated popu-
lation data Na and duration in group a. In a demographic steady state, each age
group must fulﬁll the restriction
(1xcawa) Na=(cax1xcax1wax1) Nax1: (12)
At this stage, one knows Na from aggregated population data and cawa from the
age group duration as implied by the chosen aggregation. The only unknown in (12)
is cax1, which is easily solved for all groups except the last one. For the last group,
cA follows directly from (12) on account of the restriction wA=1. For all age groups
a<A, ca can now be recovered recursively.
Individuals enter our model at age 20. We exclude ages 0–20 from the analysis
for two reasons : ﬁrst, in our model setting, the extensive schooling decision as
described in Section 8.3 in the appendix is considered to make up the initial condition
for on-the-job training, and, second, the actual survival function cannot be easily
approximated as the mortality hazard is non-monotonous.
Table 2 shows our decomposition of the population from ages 20 to 90. The aging
pattern corresponds to a life cycle biography a=(20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 85), which
serves as an aggregation key. It allows for a statement about the size and law of
motion of the various age groups. The parameters ca and wa and the inﬂow into age
group 1, N1t+1,t+1, are chosen such that the stationary solution to (15)–(18) in the
appendix corresponds to line 3 in Table 2.
5.2 Intertemporal substitution
In the literature, much eﬀort has been devoted to accurately pin down the value of
the rate of intertemporal substitution. On the one hand, macroeconomists use a
Table 2. Demographic and life-cycle parameters
Age groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cohorts 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–79 80–84 85–89
Data Na/N 0.168 0.222 0.192 0.168 0.120 0.089 0.025 0.016
Model Na/N 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.107 0.031 0.016
Labor prod. ~h
1, a
1.000 1.189 1.237 1.121 0.942 0.000 0.000 0.000
Labor prod. ~h
2, a
1.299 1.490 1.641 1.705 1.609 0.000 0.000 0.000
Labor prod. ~h
3, a
1.431 2.388 2.663 2.921 2.462 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob. 1xca 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.042 0.096 0.200
Prob. 1xva 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.074 0.061 0.115 0.000
Factor Va 1.026 1.036 1.046 1.053 1.056 1.085 1.102 1.000
Propens. 1/Da 0.039 0.044 0.051 0.062 0.078 0.104 0.161 0.220
Notes : ~h
s, a
is average productivity, 1xca probability of dying, 1xva probability of aging, Va
magniﬁcation factor reﬂecting increase in mortality, 1/Da marginal propensity to consume.
Sources : BFS (2001, 2004) and own calculations.
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large value in general, reﬂecting a common view that a high degree of intertemporal
substitution is more consistent with aggregate data considering dynamic macro-
economic models. In their seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1982) calibrate it
to 0.66, and Lucas (1990) argues that an elasticity of 0.5 appears too low when
confronted with macro data. Laitner and Silverman (2005) estimate it to be as high
as 0.87. Also, Weil (1989) ﬁnds that in order match growth and business cycle facts,
the intertemporal rate of substitution is required to be close to unity. In an inﬂuential
paper, Hall (1988) shows that consumption growth is completely insensitive to
changes in interest rates and, therefore, intertemporal elasticity is close to zero.
Guvenen (2003) argues that this apparent contradiction arises from ignoring
heterogeneity across individuals with respect to stock market participation and
wealth. The properties of aggregate variables directly linked to wealth, such as
investment and output are entirely determined by high-elasticity stockholders,
while aggregate consumption, which is more evenly distributed across households,
uncovers the low elasticity of most households. In accordance with the literature
on life cycle modeling, we calibrate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to
0.5 and check for robustness with values of 0.3 and 0.7.
5.3 Skill structure and labor market
In order to account for the established diﬀerence between labor of various skill levels
in their substitutability with capital, we use a nested CES production function com-
monly used in the relevant empirical literature; speciﬁc to our setting is the inclusion
of more than two skill classes. Every diﬀerentiated input factor in the production
function makes up for an input level in the nesting structure, as shown in Figure 11
below. We concentrate on the analysis of three diﬀerentiated skill classes, which is
a realistic reproduction of the education structure in Switzerland.
With the skill choice given by (26) in the appendix, the cost parameter js of
extensive education is calibrated using
js=
DVs
exp C(v
s)
eD
  ,
where C(vs) can be recovered from the skill distribution of the 20 year olds in
the population. As to the extensive skill choice, Heckman et al. (1998) ﬁnd that
an increase in college tuition of $1,000 (or – equivalently – a decrease in the present
value of after-tax earnings) decreases the probability of attending college by about
0.08. This estimate is slightly higher than the estimate by Kane (1994) who ﬁnds an
according decrease by 0.05 (cf. also Dupor et al., 1996). There is no clear direct
empirical evidence on the eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials on the extensive education de-
cision. Topel (1999), Card and Lemieux (2000), and Cunha et al. (2005) suggest that
teenagers use information on the wage gaps between diﬀerent attainment levels to
evaluate the size of their own future returns to schooling. Since there are many more
factors inﬂuencing high school and university attendance, such as credit constraints
and uncertainty about future earnings, we use a value of 0.1 for the semi-elasticity of
the extensive skill choice with respect to diﬀerences in indirect utility.
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The three skill classes refer to individuals whose highest level of education is
secondary I, secondary II, and tertiary, respectively. Table 3 shows the according
ISCED9 levels of our skill classes along with their relative population and labor
income shares. The skill class and age group speciﬁc productivity parameter h is
calibrated using wage data from Switzerland, 2000. The shapes of individual wage
proﬁles are displayed in Figure 6.
The income share of capital is chosen to be 0.35 (cf. _Imrohorog˘lu et al., 1995 and
Conesa and Krueger, 1999, who choose 0.36). The empirical evidence on the static
labor supply elasticity is reviewed by Hansson and Stuart (1985) and Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999). The latest, most advanced studies yield estimates of the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply between 0.05 and 0.12 for men and 0.3
and 1 for women. We calibrate the labor supply elasticity to 0.4.
Following Lord (1989) and Trostel (1993) we specify the intensive human capital
production function to be
F(e, I)=F0I&e1x& :
Table 3. Skill distribution in the Swiss population, 2000
Skill class ISCED Size Inc. share
1 1/2 19% 12%
2 3/4 54% 50%
3 5/6 27% 38%
Source : BFS (2004).
0
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Figure 6. Wageproﬁles of high, me-
dium, and low skilled workers
Source : BFS (2004), own computations.
9 ISCED is the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education.
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In order to keep the model tractable and diﬀering from the literature, current skills
do not enter human capital production, such that investment in skills has no
compounding eﬀect, cf. (23). The private cost shares of time and goods invested in
education are about 75% and 25% (Becker, 1993). We therefore specify z=0.25.
5.4 Production technology
The most important parameters to calibrate with respect to the production tech-
nology are the factor income shares and the elasticities of substitution among them.
For general production functions with more than two inputs, there are multiple
possible deﬁnitions for the elasticity of substitution between pairs of input ; we use
the Allen–Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution, which measures the percentage
change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input
prices, holding all other prices – but not all other inputs – and the output quantity
constant.
Using a nested CES production technology with two kinds of labor, Krusell et al.
(2000) estimate the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital to
be 1.67. This is close to the value of 1.5 reported by Johnson (1997). Duﬀy et al.
(2004) report a range from 1.3 to 10 for this value. Similarly, the estimate by Krusell
et al. (2000) of the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital is 0.67,
which is in the range of the estimations by Hamermesh (1993). The estimates by
Krusell et al. (2000) are also used in Lindquist (2004). There are no estimates for three
types of labor up to date. In order to account for a third skill class, we set the
elasticity of substitution between capital and low-, medium-, and high-skill labor to
1.6, 1.0, and 0.6, respectively.
6 Simulation scenarios
We start our simulations with a pure aging scenario, which consists of people be-
coming older on average and potentially living longer. In a second step, we compare
the aging scenario with a scenario where retirement is postponed accordingly by
exogenous imposition, which potentially oﬀsets the adverse economic consequences
of aging. Similar scenarios have been considered by Miles (1999), Echevarrı´a (2004),
and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005).
Becoming older in our model means that the mass of people in their eighties
becomes larger because more of the younger agents make it to their eighties. Living
longer means that the life-time horizon gets longer. To implement the scenario, we
raise the survival rates of age groups 5 to 8 as in Table 4 but keep the expected
duration in each age group constant. The mortality rates 1xca decline, which
necessarily implies that a larger fraction of this group moves to the next one, instead
of dying. Since the last group becomes less mortal, 1xc8 falling from 0.2 to 0.12,
expected duration in that group rises from 5 to (1xc8)x1=8.3 years. The represen-
tative agent lives longer, namely 93.3 instead of 90 years. This corresponds to
the aging scenario in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) who discuss the implications of
longevity in a model with a single mortality rate.
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In the simulations, we start with a net foreign debt–GDP ratio calibrated to equal
0.25. In a small open economy, the real interest rate is ﬁxed on world markets. Any
imbalance between domestic savings and investment is thus reﬂected in a change
in the net foreign asset position.10
6.1 Population aging
The eﬀects of population aging are summarized in Table 7 in the appendix. Even
though the interest rate remains constant, the ratio between capital and the three
diﬀerent kinds of labor varies due to the nested CES-production technology de-
scribed in Section 8.4. Aging results in a larger number of old people. In the absence
of an oﬀsetting decline in fertility, the mass of younger age groups remains
unchanged, leading to a constant workforce. By assumption, the increased number of
retirees increases required PAYG contributions by almost 40%. These crowd out
private savings and aggregate asset holdings by households (x22.5% in the baseline
case), which is reﬂected in a sharp decrease in net foreign assets. The projected fall in
savings is also found byMiles (1999). Since PAYG contributions are lump-sum, there
is no direct eﬀect on wages and labor supply; GDP and the capital stock remain
virtually unchanged. The slight increase in the capital stock induces a rise of wage
diﬀerentials. The decrease in the utility diﬀerences between skill classes, which leads
to a fall in educational attainment, is due to the increase in total pension beneﬁts,
which is relatively more important for unskilled labor. The resulting decrease of the
high-skilled workforce increases the wage of skilled labor, which leads to an increase
in individual labor supply of skilled workers. Human wealth, consisting of human
capital and social security wealth, increases in all skill classes ; the increase in total
pension entitlements beneﬁts low-skilled workers most, however, because the pro-
portional increase in PAYG contributions aﬀects them least relative to their total
wealth.
Table 4. Aging and life expectancy
Age groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial Na 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.107 0.031 0.016
New Na 0.179 0.177 0.175 0.168 0.148 0.121 0.047 0.058
Factor rca 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.020 1.050 1.100
Prob. 1xca 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.050 0.120
Prob. 1xva 0.099 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.083 0.079 0.158 0.000
Note : 1xca mortality rate, 1xva probability of aging.
10 In a closed economy, the domestic real interest rate would adjust to keep net foreign assets to zero. This
second scenario would also be interesting, as aging is a worldwide phenomenon that might lead to a
decline in the real interest rate via increased savings. For example, computations by Bo¨rsch-Supan
(2004) yield a decline in the return to capital by roughly one percentage point as a result of worldwide
aging.
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6.2 Population aging and postponed retirement
In the second simulation, we consider an increase in the retirement age by two years.
The third simulation will then merge the two ﬁrst scenarios in order to evaluate
the combined eﬀect of aging and pension reform. For simplicity, we impose the
postponement of retirement exogenously.
A two-year postponement of retirement increases the workforce by 3.6%, while
reducing the number of retirees by 16.1% (cf. Table 8 in the appendix). Keeping
per-capita pension beneﬁts constant, this results in a decrease in necessary PAYG
contributions by 18.2%. Postponed retirement reduces the need for individual
pension savings, so that asset holdings decrease by 8.2% in the baseline case.
Postponed retirement prolongs the redemption period of investments in human
capital, such that the utility diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled workers
increases and educational attainment rises. Also, education at the intensive margin
rises due to a longer redemption period of human capital investments. This is
reﬂected in increased levels of human wealth. These results are perfectly in line
with the comparative static eﬀects found in Section 4.4 in the context of the illus-
trative model. In a similar experiment, Trostel (1993) ﬁnds that the level of the
income tax rate decisively aﬀects human capital accumulation.11 However, his
quantitative results are not directly comparable to ours, since an increase in the
income tax rate aﬀects both the costs and beneﬁts of investment in human capital,
while, in our setting, postponed retirement only aﬀects the beneﬁt side of the
education decision.
The third simulation considers a scenario on top of population aging with
potentially less severe economic consequences due to the postponement of retire-
ment (cf. Table 9 in the appendix).12 Part of the overall population increase accrues
now to workers. Therefore, PAYG payments increase only by 20.2%, compared
with 40% in the case of constant retirement. Also, the adverse skill choice eﬀects
are somewhat mitigated. However, since postponed retirement reduces the time
individuals stay in retirement, there is less need for individual savings to augment
consumption possibilities at later ages. Therefore, the decrease in asset holdings
due to aging is even aggravated. This eﬀect is a result, however, of the low level of
PAYG payments. Higher beneﬁt levels would lessen the need for private savings
and therefore dampen the adverse eﬀect of postponed retirement on asset holdings.
The disproportionate increase of low-skilled individuals’ human wealth lowers
educational attainment and thereby the capital stock via the complementarity
between capital and high-skilled labor, as discussed in Section 4. Together, they
depress GDP by 2.3% in the baseline simulation. Hence, considering individual
saving eﬀects, and allowing for capital–skill complementarity in production, results
in postponed retirement not being appropriate to mitigate the adverse economic
eﬀects of population aging.
11 In his simulation, a 1% increase in the income tax rate causes human capital to decline by 0.39%.
12 In fact, based on welfare considerations, Andersen (2005) argues that the retirement age should be
proportional to expected life length, just as education with respect to the length of the working period in
(4) and (5) in our simple illustrative model.
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Figure 7 displays the discrete skill choice over time. The solid line depicts the
choice for high-skilled labor relative to the initial steady state. The dashed and dotted
lines show medium- and low-skilled labor, respectively.
Reduced utility diﬀerences between diﬀerent skill classes sharply decrease
educational attainment. In the long run, wages adjust, and attainment returns
towards its initial level. This is exactly the eﬀect shown in 4 in the context of the
stylized model. The relative size of the three skill groups evolves according to
the inﬂows of individuals into these groups, as displayed in Figure 8. Again, the solid
line depicts high-skilled labor relative to the initial steady state. The dashed and
dotted lines show medium- and low-skilled labor, respectively.
The key model parameters are the elasticity of substitution between capital and
the three diﬀerent kinds of labor as well as the education choice parameters at the
extensive and intensive margins. We check the robustness of our results and the
importance of the educational decision margins by varying the values of these par-
ameters. Table 5 displays the sensitivity of the eﬀect of aging and postponed retire-
ment on aggregate human wealth. Overall, human wealth increases due to the
prolongation of the redemption period, which yields investments in human capital
more proﬁtable at any stage of the life cycle.
As economic intuition suggests, total human wealth reacts more the higher the
training elasticity with respect to training returns ee. However, its responsiveness
decreases in the semi-elasticity of the discrete skill choice decision. This is due to the
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Figure 7. Discrete skill choice over time
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Figure 8. The size of the three skill
classes
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negative reaction of educational attainment to aging and postponed retirement,
which partly oﬀsets the positive eﬀect on intensive human capital formation.
Table 6 shows the sensitivity of human wealth to the elasticities of substitution
between capital and low-skilled labor, sK,L1 , and between capital and high-skilled
labor, sK,L3 , which determine the degree of complementarity between capital and
skill. The larger the diﬀerence sK,L1xsK,L3 , the larger is the complementarity. In the
ﬁrst column, all elasticities of substitution between capital and labor are equal to
unity, as for example with a Cobb–Douglas production technology. As in Table 5, an
increase in the skill choice semi-elasticity reduces the response of human wealth to
aging and postponed retirement due to lower attainment. An increase in capital–skill
complementarity aﬀects the response of human wealth to aging and postponed re-
tirement only to the degree that individuals actually adapt their skill choice to labor
market conditions; i.e., with ed close to zero, capital–skill complementarity is of
little economic importance.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the importance of education and human capital formation
in a macroeconomic context. We apply the concept of probabilistic aging with
endogenous discrete skill choice to analyze the economic impact of aging during
demographic transition. The model setting allows for an appraisal of inter- and
intragenerational distribution eﬀects by considering eight age groups and three skill
classes with endogenous human capital accumulation at the extensive and intensive
Table 5. Sensitivity of human wealth to education parameters
ee=0.10 ee=0.30 ee=0.50 ee=0.70 ee=0.90
ed=0.05 19.813 26.204 33.766 42.877 54.123
ed=0.10 19.320 25.644 33.148 42.216 53.438
ed=0.15 19.028 25.315 32.787 41.832 53.043
ed=0.20 18.834 25.098 32.550 41.580 52.784
ed=0.25 18.695 24.943 32.381 41.401 52.601
Table 6. Sensitivity of human wealth to capital–skill complementarity
sK,L
1
=1:0 sK,L
1
=1:5 sK,L
1
=2:0 sK,L
1
=2:5 sK,L
1
=3:0
sK,L
3
=1:0 sK,L
3
=0:8 sK,L
3
=0:6 sK,L
3
=0:4 sK,L
3
=0:2
ed=0.01 27.063 27.064 27.064 27.064 27.064
ed=0.05 26.229 26.204 26.182 26.163 26.145
ed=0.10 25.705 25.648 25.594 25.547 25.500
ed=0.50 24.730 24.571 24.414 24.265 24.110
ed=0.90 24.543 24.357 24.171 23.993 23.805
Notes : sK,L
2
=1:0, ee=0:3.
Education, demographics, and the economy 207
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474747207002983
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:45:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
margins. The empirically well-established complementarity between capital and
skilled labor is embraced in a nested CES production technology. Simulating the
eﬀect of aging on key macro variables, we ﬁnd that the remunerations of labor in
diﬀerent skill classes and accordingly their size are very diﬀerently aﬀected. In a
small open economy, where the interest rate is tied to international capital markets,
GDP contracts due to decreased labor supply as a result of lower net wages and
the adverse eﬀect on educational attainment. Postponed retirement solves this
problem partially by prolonging the redemption period of investments in human
capital and thereby inducing higher extensive and intensive education. However,
it introduces a new one: decreased private savings due to a lower need for funded
old-age beneﬁts.
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8 Appendix
This ﬁrst appendix outlines the concept of probabilistic aging as in Grafenhofer et al.
(2005), which allows for the possibility that an individual keeps her individual
characteristics, such as age and productivity in the next time period, but also that
she may be struck by sudden death. In the second appendix, we describe individual
life-cycle optimization with respect to labor supply and intensive education. The
third appendix contains a discussion of the extensive education decision. In the
fourth appendix, we present the production part of the model with capital–skill
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complementarity in the production technology. The ﬁfth appendix contains the
simulation results in table form.
8.1 Probabilistic aging
In order to reproduce realistic wage proﬁles, individuals must undergo some kind
of aging. To preserve aggregability, aging is absent in Blanchard-style models of
‘perpetual youth’ with overlapping generations. Since we are interested in modeling
life-cycle wage proﬁles in the context of an OLG model of the Blanchard style,
while still being able to ﬁnd closed-form aggregate solutions, we use the concept of
probabilistic aging to model aging as shown in Figure 9. In this section, we concen-
trate on individual decisions once their skill level s is determined and ﬁxed. We
therefore temporarily drop superscript s. Each individual is a member of one of A
age or productivity groups as{1, …, A}. Individuals are born in age group a=1 as
workers. The aﬃliation of a variable at time t to an individual currently belonging
to age group a is denoted by (.)t
a.
To model demographics, we allow for mortality among all age groups. When an
individual with an arbitrarily given life-cycle history plans for the next period, she
faces the risk of aging and dying (cf. Figure 9). She must thus reckon with three
possible events : (i) she dies with probability 1xca ; (ii) she survives without aging and
remains in the same age group with probability cava, and (iii) she survives and ages
and belongs to age group a+1 next period with probability ca (1xva). Individuals in
the last age group have exhausted the aging process and remain in this group with
probability one, vA=1. They may either survive with probability cA within group A
or die with probability 1xcA. In this setting, time passes faster than age, i.e.
individuals normally stay in the same age group for several periods. The last age
group behaves according to the mortality and demographic assumptions of
Blanchard’s perpetual youth model.
The number of agents at date t, in state of life a and with aging history a is given by
Naa,t. Within this group, agents are identical up to their skill level and asset holdings
and face the same independent probability of moving to one of the alternative states.
With stochastically independent risks, the law of large numbers implies that the
above-stated individual probabilities correspond to the fraction of people that
are subject to the respective events. Consequently, the group is divided into three
subgroups next period: (i) those who die, (ii) those who survive within the same age
group a, and (iii) those who are hit by an aging event, switch to the next higher
γ 1ω1 γ 2ω2
A
γ 1(1– ω1)
1–γ 1 1–γ 2 1–γ A
γ A
1 2
Figure 9. Aging and mortality hazard of indi-
viduals in the model
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age group. The age group and the biography a remains unchanged in case (ii)
while switching to the next higher age group a+1 in case (iii) adds another event in
a person’s life cycle history a and thereby results in a new biography ak :
(i) N#
a#, t+1=N
a
a, t  (1xca), death,
(ii) Naa, t+1 =N
a
a, t  cava, no aging,
(iii) Na+1a0, t+1=N
a
a, t  ca(1xva), aging:
(13)
Since the characteristics of people such as their earnings potential diﬀer across age
groups, an agent’s consumption, assets, and other economic variables will generally
depend on her particular life cycle history. For example, assets depend on the agent’s
past earnings history which, in turn, is linked to her aging trajectory. To keep track
of the population’s heterogeneity, one must thus identify each agent by her age group
as well as her aging biography a which also includes the date of birth. An agent’s life
cycle history is her biography of aging events that have happened since birth. At
date t, the set of possible histories of a household that belongs to age group a is
@at  {(a1, . . . , aa): a1< . . .<aaft}: (14)
A particular life-cycle history is represented by a vector as@ta. The element ai,
is{1, …, a}, denotes the date at which the household who was formerly in age
group ix1 became a member of group i. In denoting the unborn by a virtual age
group zero, the element a1 lists the date of birth when an agent switches from the
group of the unborn to the ﬁrst age group. We say that a member of group a=1 aged
only once with no further aging since birth. Nevertheless, diﬀerent persons of the
ﬁrst age group are heterogeneous since they were born at diﬀerent moments in
the past. The set of possible biographies is then @t1={(a1) :toa1}. With this notation,
the vectors a describing the biography of people in group a have a elements since
such persons have aged a times in total.
The individual biographies are updated when a person is subject to an aging event.
Suppose a person is in age group ax1 and is identiﬁed by a given biography
a=(a1, …, aax1). When the next aging event occurs in period t, she arrives in group a
next period. Her biography is appended by the entry t+1 and will thus read
(a1, …, aax1, t+1). Accordingly, the set @ta of biographies of age group a will be
augmented next period by all the biographies aks@tax1r(t+1) that have t+1 as their
last entry and refer to people who currently switch from group ax1 to a. Hence
@at+1=@at [ @ax1t r(t+1), a2{1, . . . , A}:
Result 1. With the number of individuals in age group a given by
Nat  ;
a2@at
Naa, t, (15)
(a) the aggregate law of motion for age group 1<afA is
Nat+1=c
ava Nat+cax1(1xvax1) Nax1t , vA=1, (16)
(b) age group 1 evolves according to
N1t+1=c
1v1 N1t+N1(t+1), t+1, (17)
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(c) total population grows by
Nt+1=Nt+N1(t+1), t+1,x ;
A
a=1
(1xca)Nat , Nt  ;
A
a=1
Nat : (18)
Proof Cf. Grafenhofer et al. (2005). %
8.2 Life cycle optimization
In diﬀerent stages of the life cycle, the individuals’ choice set varies, such that inter-
temporal optimization diﬀers across age groups. As a representative case, we sketch
the problem of individuals belonging to the last working age group. The analogous
problem of other age groups is detailed in Jaag et al. (2005).
Individuals are working with probability pt and retired with probability 1xpt.
Workers use time for post-school training e and hours worked l, giving rise to eﬀort
costs Qe and Ql for education and work, respectively, multiplied by skill h. State
variables are assets A and skills h. Preferences are assumed additively separable
in consumption C and job-related eﬀorts. The per-capita Bellman equation for
maximizing expected life-time utility is13
V(Aa, t,
ahaa, t)=max
Q, e, l
[(Qaa, t)
r+cab(G Vaa, t+1)
r]1=r, (19)
Qaa, t=C
a
a, txptQl(l
a
t )h
a
a, txptQe(e
a
t ), (20)
Vaa, t+1  vaVaa, t+1+(1xva)Va+1a0, t+1: (21)
With R denoting the real interest factor and G an exogenous growth rate, workers
accumulate assets and skills according to
caGAaa, t+1=Rt+1[A
a
a, t+pt(y
a
a, t+z
aW
t )+(1xpt)z
aR
t xQ
a
a, t], (22)
Ghaa, t+1=(1xd
S)haa, t+F(e
a
a, t, I
a
a, t), (23)
where zaWt is an exogenous transfer or a lump-sum tax to workers, z
aR
t a transfer
to retirees, dS skill depreciation, and F(.) is the intensive skill production function,
assumed to be linear homogenous. Switching to the next age group implies hak,t+1
a+1 =
ha,t+1
a and Aak,t+1
a+1 =Aa,t+1a . Net labor income is given by
yaa, t=[w
a
t l
a
txQl(l
a
t )]h
a
a, txQe(e
a
t )xIt,
where wt
a is the wage per eﬃciency or productivity unit per hour, ha,t
a is the agent’s
productivity (skill) resulting from past training, and Ia,t
a is physical investment in
training (books, computers, teachers). We assume that this is a government provided
rival good, and thus exogenously controlled. It is supplied at the same amount for all
per capita, Ia,t
a =It, and the cost of it is charged to private agents, giving rise to private
spending It.
13 Preferences are represented by a CES utility function as in Farmer (1990) and Weil (1990). This formu-
lation allows for risk neutrality, while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution can be chosen arbi-
trarily.
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It is convenient to deﬁne the shadow prices ga,t
a of assets and xa,t
a of skills
gaa, t 
@Vaa, t
@Aaa, t
GVaa, t
 rx1
, xaa, t 
@Vaa, t
@haa, t
GVaa, t
 rx1
, maa, t 
xaa, t
gaa, t
xaa, t+1  va
@Vaa, t+1
@haa, t+1
+(1xva)
@Va+1
ak, t+1
@ha+1ak, t+1
" #
G V
a
a, t+1
 rx1
,
gaa, t+1  va
@Vaa, t+1
@Aaa, t+1
+(1xva)
@Va+1
ak, t+1
@Aa+1
ak, t+1
" #
G V
a
a, t+1
 rx1
,
maa, t vamaa, t+1+ 1xvað Þ Da+1t+1 =Dat+1
 1xr
r ma+1a, t+1:
The optimality conditions for (19) subject to (22)/(23) are
Qaa, t: Q
a
a, t
 rx1
=bRt+1 gaa, t+1 ,
lat : Qlk l
a
t
 
=wat ,
eat : Qek e
a
t
 
=FE
ca xaa, t+1
Rt+1 gaa, t+1
,
where FE denotes the partial derivatives of F with respect to e. The envelope theorem
yields
Aaa, t: g
a
a, t=G
rx1bRt+1 g
a
a, t+1 ,
haa, t: m
a
a, t=w
a
t l
a
txQ
a
L, t+(1xd
S)
ca xaa, t+1
Rt+1 gaa, t+1
:
Result 2. Consumption Qa,t
a and indirect utility Va,t
a are
(a) Qaa, t = 1=D
a
t
 
Aaa, t+H
a
a, t+S
a
a, t
 
, s=1= 1xrð Þ,
(b) Vaa, t = D
a
t
 1=r
Qaa, t,
(c) Dat = 1+c
abs Vat+1Rt+1
 sx1
Dat+1,
(d ) Vat+1 = v
a+ 1xvað Þ Da+1t+1 =Dat+1
 1xr
r ,
(e) Haa, t = pty
a
a, t+c
aG H
a
a, t+1 = V
a
t+1Rt+1
 
,
yaa, t = w
a
t l
a
txQl l
a
t
  	
haa, txQe e
a
t
 
xIt,
( f ) H
a
a, t+1 = v
aHaa, t+1+ 1xv
að Þ Da+1t+1 =Dat+1
 1xr
r Ha+1
ak, t+1,
(g) Saa, t = z
a
t+c
aG S
a
a, t+1 = V
a
t+1Rt+1
 
,
(h) S
a
a, t+1 = v
aSaa, t+1+ 1xv
að Þ Da+1t+1 =Dat+1
 1xr
r Sa+1
ak, t+1:
Vt+1
a augments the interest rate Rt+1, accounting for the expected ﬁniteness of life,
Dt
a is the inverse of the marginal propensity to consume, H is human capital, and S is
social security wealth.
Proof Cf. Jaag et al. (2005), proposition 3. %
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Physical investment in education I being determined exogenously, there are private
rents on education yra, which derive from the inframargial eﬀort and the non-optimal
supply of I.
Result 3. Human capital can be written as shadow price times accumulated skills
Haa, t=m
a
t h
a
a, t+hr
a
t , hr
a
t=yr
a
t+
caGhrat+1
Rt+1V
a
t+1
, (24)
where
yrat=F
a
t
camat+1
Rt+1V
a
t+1
xptQaExdtI,
hrat+1=v
ahrat+1+(1xv
a)(Da+1t+1 =D
a
t+1)
1xr
r hra+1t+1 :
Proof Cf. Jaag et al. (2005), equation (28). %
8.3 Discrete skill choice
At the beginning of their life cycle, individuals choose their skill level. For
simplicity, we assume this education to be instantaneous with no time being con-
sumed.14 We distinguish several discrete skill classes and introduce an upper index
ss{1, …, S} to identify these groups (e.g. high, medium, and low skilled in case of
three groups). The structure of individual decisions in the preceding section is
identical for all skill classes. Indirect utility of a new agent born at date t with skill s
is V(t),t
s,1 . This agent necessarily belongs to age group 1 and has history a1=t. Let
Qv
s>0 be the incremental education eﬀort cost that an agent with skill s needs to
spend to obtain skill s+1. The discrete skill choice at the beginning of the life
cycle is
s=arg max
~s2{1, ...,S}
V~s, 1(t), tx ;
~sx1
i=1
Qin(n),
dQin(n)
dn
>0: (25)
To obtain a determinate education decision, we must assume heterogeneity of agents
with respect to ability, which is inversely related to the index n2[0, n] .
The discrete skill choice is most easily found by starting with the lowest skill class
s=1 and asking whether it pays to obtain the next higher degree. Following this
procedure, an agent with skill s acquires the incremental education to obtain degree
s+1 if the following inequality derived from (25) holds : V(t),ts+1,1>V(t),ts,1 +Qns(n). For
high-cost, low-ability persons, it is eventually not worthwhile anymore to incur
14 Mincer (1989) argues that – opposed to investment in on-the-job-training – almost none of the goods
invested in education is bought with foregone earnings.
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the incremental education cost. Hence, there exists a critical agent vs who is just
indiﬀerent between degrees s and s+1
Vs+1, 1(t), t =V
s, 1
(t), t+Q
s
n(n) ) nst : (26)
Since education cost increases in v, agents with lower ability v>vs and higher cost
remain with skill s. Figure 10 illustrates.
New agents are distributed by the cumulative distribution function C(v). Of all
N(t),t
1 new agents in period t, a share pt
s chooses skill group s where 1 gives the lowest
and S the highest skill group
Ns, 1(t), t=N
1
(t), tp
s
t , p
s
t=
1xC n1t
 
s=1,
C nsx1t
 
xC nst
 
1<s<S,
C nSt
 
s=S:
8><
>:
The educational choice is open only to new households while older ones are locked
into their previously chosen skill group. Hence, the law of motion for the number of
individuals in age group 1 with skill level s is
Ns, 1t+1=c
1v1Ns, 1t +N
s, 1
(t+1), t+1:
Assume a uniform distribution of the population vyU (0, 1) which implies C(ns)=ns .
We specify the cost of education to be
cs(n)=jsexp ns=edð Þ ) nst=ed lnDVs, 1(t), txlnjs
h i
:
This speciﬁcation implies a semi-elasticity ed of the education decision with respect
to DVs  Vs+1xVs, i.e. dns=ed  (dDVs, 1=DVs, 1) . When life-time utility of skill s+1
increases relative to s, the critical value ns increases and the share of skill group s
in the new cohort declines by dns.
8.4 Capital–skill complementarity in production
In our model, we allow for diﬀerentiated labor in the production function. As
opposed to Heckman et al. (1998), Blundell and Bond (2000), and Blundell et al.
0
V1
V2
V3
¯ν 1ν2
V1 + c1(ν)V2 + c2(ν)
ν
Figure 10. Discrete skill choice
with three skill classes
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(2003), we explicitly allow for capital–skill complementarity and hence for a
non-constant share of capital in production. There are several ways of nesting the
diﬀerentiated production factors within a CES function, of which six allow for
full capital–skill complementarity. With a monotonous ordering of labor inputs
according to their skill level, there are two nestings
Y=U1(L1,U2(L2,U3(L3,K))),
Y0=U1(L3,U2(L2,U3(L1,K))),
where U1,U2,U3 are CES aggregators. Yk implies the elasticity of substitution be-
tween L3 and K to be the same as between L1 and L3 by the symmetry restrictions of
the CES functional form. This is at odds with factor elasticity estimates, which sug-
gest that the substitution elasticity between skilled labor and unskilled labor is higher
than the substitution elasticity between skilled labor and capital (cf. Hamermesh,
1993; Krusell et al., 2000). Hence, we choose Y which does not seem to be at variance
with elasticity estimates. This ordering of the CES nesting also conforms with the
functional form chosen by Duﬀy et al. (2004).
For the simulations, we use a production function with three kinds of labor and
capital as inputs of the form (cf. Figure 11)
Y=U1(L1,U2(L2,U3(L3,K ))): (27)
The most aggregate nest is ﬁnal output Y, which consists of unskilled labor L1,
and a quantity Y2, which is the output of the next subnest and itself consists of
medium-skilled labor L2 and a composite Y3. This last quantity is a composite of
high-skilled labor L3 and capital K. The parameters k1, k2, k3 are related to sub-
stitution elasticities, and a1, a2, a3 are distribution parameters. The technology is
thus
Y=Y 0 a1 (L1)k
1
+(1xa1) (Y2)k
1
h i1=k1
,
Y2= a2 (L2)k
2
+(1xa2) (Y3)k
2
h i1=k2
,
Y3= a3 (L3)k
3
+(1xa3) (K)k
3
h i1=k3
:
Y
Y2
Y3
K
L1
L2
L3
σ1
σ 2
σ 3
Figure 11. Production tech-
nology with three-level
nested CES structure
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Note that only one type of labor enters at each level of nesting. The technology can
be characterized by the price elasticity of demand for the input factors. Let ws be
the unit price of labor of type s and cs the unit cost of output of level s, i.e. cs=FLs.Ls/
Ys+cs+1.Ys+1/Ys. The cost-minimization problem at each level s is
cs= min
Ls,Ys+1
FLs
Ls
Ys
+cs+1
Ys+1
Ys
, s:t: 1= as
Ls
Ys
 ks
+(1xas)
Ys+1
Ys
 ks" #1=ks
:
We get input demands at level s
Ls= as
cs
FLs
 ss
Ys, Ys+1= (1xas)
cs
cs+1
 ss
Ys, ss  1
1xks
:
By forward substitution, total compensated demand for labor on aggregation level
ss{1, 2, 3}, Ls, is given by
Ls=Ys asð Þss c
s
FLs
 ss
=Yt FLsð Þxs
s
(as)s
s
(c1)
s1
Ys
n=2
(1xanx1)s
nx1
cnð Þsnxsnx1 :
By Shephard’s lemma, the derivative of total cost with respect to wi equals the
demand for input factor i
@cs
@FLi
=
0 i<s,
Li
Ys
ios:
8<
:
Therefore, the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for labor s is
@Ls
@FLs
FLs
Ls
=xss+s1
@c1
@FLs
FLs
c1
+ ;
s
n=2
(snxsnx1)
@cn
@FLs
FLs
cn
:
Let ks{i, j} denote the deepest price aggregate which contains both FLi and
FL
j.Taking into account the impact of FL
i on c jfk, the cross price elasticity is
given by
ei, j  @L
i
@FL j
FL j
Li
=s1
@c1
@FL j
FL j
c1
+ ;
k
n=2
(snxsnx1)
@cn
@FL j
FLs
c n
:
In analogy, the cross price elasticity between labor Ls and capital K is
eL
s,K  @L
s
@wK
wK
Ls
=s1
@c1
@wK
wK
c1
+ ;
s
n=2
(snxsnx1)
@cn
@wK
wK
cn
,
where wK is the cost per unit of capital.
The key parameters to consider in the calibration of the production side of the
model are the elasticities of substitution between input factors. For production
functions with more than two inputs, there are multiple possible deﬁnitions for the
elasticity of substitution between pairs of input. The most commonly used is the
Allen–Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution which measures the percentage change
in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input prices,
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holding all other prices – but not all other inputs – and the output quantity constant.
This measure is widely used in the empirical literature, e.g. by Sato (1967), Griliches
(1969), and Goldin and Katz (1998). The Allen–Uzawa elasticity of substitution is
si, j  ei, j c
1Y1
FL jq j
,
where qj is the quantity of input good j.15 Denote by k the deepest aggregate
containing both inputs i and j. In the production function with the nest at level 1
producing ﬁnal output, the elasticities of substitution between any two input factors
i and j write as
si, j=s1+Y1c1 ;
k
n=2
(snxsnx1)
Yncn
, (28)
where cn is the unit cost of a nest at level n and sn= 11xkn: Note that the elasticity of
substitution between i and j is independent of the subnest elasticity in all nests s>k.
Applying the concept of capital–skill complementarity implies in the setting of our
production technology that16
sK,L
i
<sK,L
j, i>j:
The relative income shares of the three kinds of labor and capital are known from
data. The elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled/unskilled labor are
taken from the empirical literature. Using three types of labor, it is clear that high-
skilled labor is even more complementary with capital than skilled labor in the
literature dealing with two kinds of labor only. Hence, we correct the respective
elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled/unskilled labor accordingly.
The values of s1, s2, s3 are computed from (28) recursively
s1=sK,H
1
, s2=
c2Y2
c1Y1
(sK,H
2
xs1)+s1,
s3=
c3Y3
c1Y1
sK,H
3
xs1x
c1Y1
c2Y2
(s2xs1)
 
+s2:
Using ks  1x 1ss we get k1=0.375, k2=0.045, k3=x0.238 (cf. Figure 11). From
national accounting we know the income shares of the diﬀerent production factors.
Taking these into account, we can calibrate the distribution coeﬃcients a1=0.163,
a2=0.365, a3=0.288.
15 Another measure is the Hicks–Allen direct partial elasticity of substitution which measures the per-
centage change in the ratio of two inputs in response to a change in the ratio of the two input prices,
holding all other prices, inputs, and the output quantity constant.
16 Duﬀy et al. (2004) show that in the two-level CES speciﬁcation of (27) with L1 denoting low-skilled labor
and L2 high-skilled labor, the capital–skill complementarity holds iﬀ s2<s1, regardless of which elas-
ticity measure is used. We are well aware that the Allen–Uzawa elasticity as a measure of substitutability
lacks the salient theoretical properties the Hicksian elasticity of substitution exhibits in the two-goods
case (cf. Blackorby and Russell, 1989). Since most of the empirical literature deals with that measure,
however, we also stick to it.
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8.5 Simulation results
Table 7. Long-run impact of aging on key macro variables in percentage changes
relative to initial steady state
Key macro variable s=0.3 s=0.5 s=0.7
r Real interest rate* 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Df/Y Debt–GDP ratio* 0.250 x0.219 x0.360 x0.596
zs PAYG contributions 39.394 39.394 39.394
w1 Wage rate low-skilled labor x0.719 x0.967 x1.725
w2 Wage rate medium-skilled labor x0.113 x0.150 x0.257
w3 Wage rate high-skilled labor 0.378 0.506 0.895
l1 Low-skilled labor supply x0.288 x0.388 x0.694
l2 Medium-skilled labor supply x0.045 x0.060 x0.103
l3 High-skilled labor supply 0.151 0.202 0.357
W(t),t
1,1 Low-skilled human wealth p.c. 1.436 6.660 18.851
W(t),t
2,1 Medium-skilled human wealth p.c. 1.125 4.595 13.585
W(t),t
3,1 High-skilled human wealth p.c. 1.058 3.914 12.036
DV1 Utility diﬀerence 1 x5.431 x7.295 x12.851
DV2 Utility diﬀerence 2 x5.294 x7.049 x12.116
N1 Low-skilled individuals 2.939 3.987 7.240
N2 Medium-skilled individuals x0.027 x0.049 x0.156
N3 High-skilled individuals x2.015 x2.707 x4.784
NW Number of workers 0.000 0.000 0.000
NR Number of retirees 39.394 39.394 39.394
K Capital stock x0.003 0.106 0.397
Y Gross domestic product, GDP 0.068 0.201 0.568
C Aggregate consumption x2.343 x2.928 x3.758
A Aggregate assets x17.382 x22.510 x31.096
Notes : Pension beneﬁts p.c. and public consumption p.c. constant;Wa,t
s,a=Ha,ts,a+Sa,ts,a ; * absolute
values, initial values in ﬁrst column.
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Table 8. Long-run impact of a two-year retirement postponement on key macro
variables in percentage changes relative to initial steady state
Key macro variable s=0.3 s=0.5 s=0.7
r Real interest rate* 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Df/Y Debt–GDP ratio* 0.250 0.103 0.090 0.071
zs PAYG contributions x18.196 x18.196 x18.196
w1 Wage rate low-skilled labor 0.231 0.245 0.275
w2 Wage rate medium-skilled labor x0.077 x0.072 x0.062
w3 Wage rate high-skilled labor 0.028 0.018 x0.006
l1 Low-skilled labor supply 0.092 0.098 0.110
l2 Medium-skilled labor supply x0.031 x0.029 x0.025
l3 High-skilled labor supply 0.011 0.007 x0.002
W(t),t
1,1 Low-skilled human wealth p.c. 0.982 1.526 2.786
W(t),t
2,1 Medium-skilled human wealth p.c. 0.742 1.059 1.769
W(t),t
3,1 High-skilled human wealth p.c. 0.974 1.217 1.763
DV1 Utility diﬀerence 1 0.489 0.578 0.765
DV2 Utility diﬀerence 2 1.371 1.491 1.751
N1 Low-skilled individuals x0.257 x0.303 x0.401
N2 Medium-skilled individuals x0.162 x0.167 x0.180
N3 High-skilled individuals 0.504 0.548 0.643
NW Number of workers 3.622 3.622 3.622
NR Number of retirees x16.131 x16.131 x16.131
K Capital stock x2.545 x2.454 x2.245
Y Gross domestic product, GDP x2.553 x2.464 x2.258
C Aggregate consumption x3.685 x3.659 x3.542
A Aggregate assets x7.837 x8.239 x8.741
Notes : Pension beneﬁts p.c. and public consumption p.c. constant ;Wa,t
s,a=Ha,ts,a+Sa,ts,a ; * absolute
values, initial values in ﬁrst column.
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Table 9. Long-run impact of aging and postponed retirement on key macro
variables in percentage changes relative to initial steady state
Key macro variable s=0.3 s=0.5 s=0.7
r Real interest rate* 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Df/Y Debt-GDP ratio* 0.250 x0.435 x0.593 x0.859
zs PAYG contributions 20.228 20.228 20.228
w1 Wage rate low-skilled labor x0.498 x0.740 x1.486
w2 Wage rate medium-skilled labor x0.191 x0.224 x0.324
w3 Wage rate high-skilled labor 0.410 0.532 0.907
l1 Low-skilled labor supply x0.200 x0.297 x0.597
l2 Medium-skilled labor supply x0.076 x0.090 x0.130
l3 High-skilled labor supply 0.164 0.212 0.362
W(t),t
1,1 Low-skilled human wealth p.c. 2.551 8.219 21.479
W(t),t
2,1 Medium-skilled human wealth p.c. 1.913 5.628 15.196
W(t),t
3,1 High-skilled human wealth p.c. 2.046 5.091 13.664
DV1 Utility diﬀerence 1 x5.015 x6.850 x12.364
DV2 Utility diﬀerence 2 x4.045 x5.758 x10.782
N1 Low-skilled individuals 2.708 3.735 6.946
N2 Medium-skilled individuals x0.188 x0.216 x0.331
N3 High-skilled individuals x1.529 x2.197 x4.225
NW Number of workers 3.622 3.622 3.622
NR Number of retirees 23.263 23.263 23.263
K Capital stock x2.606 x2.432 x1.980
Y Gross domestic product, GDP x2.544 x2.346 x1.823
C Aggregate consumption x6.379 x6.970 x7.767
A Aggregate assets x27.333 x32.918 x42.281
Notes : Pension beneﬁts p.c. and public consumption p.c. constant;Wa,t
s,a=Ha,ts,a+Sa,ts,a ; * absolute
values, initial values in ﬁrst column.
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